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.Pershingbelieved that the Americans would not be ready to make a decisive impact until 1919,when he expected to have three million troops in France.Besides establishing thebasic parameters of his overseas force, Pershing and his small staff immediately setto work reading maps, touring the front, and studying supply routes to decide wherethe AEF would fight.The British held the northern part of the Western Front and theFrench occupied the south.In the end, the Americans settled on taking over theLorraine sector of the front, exactly where the French wanted them.From the Frenchperspective, placing American troops in this relatively inactive southern sector far THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR 15American tanks heading into battle during the Meuse-Argonne campaign.(Courtesy of theNational Archives)from the British would ensure French influence over training and even combatoperations involving American troops.Railroads also connected this region to portsin Brest on lines running south of Paris, thus avoiding already overtaxed routes strain-ing to supply the French and the British further north.For the Americans, the Lorrainesector offered advantages as well.Many of Pershing s staff officers were already inti-mately familiar with the terrain in Lorraine as a result of intensive pre-war study ofthe Franco-Prussian War.Perhaps more importantly, Pershing believed that the keyGerman railroad lines and iron mines above Metz and the coal mines in the Saar gavethe AEF the kind of targets that would help Pershing fulfill his goal of launching adefinitive attack in 1919.In retrospect, Pershing may have employed faulty reasoning in selecting Metz as adecisive target.The German railroad line that Pershing expected to cut at Metz actuallyturned west much further north at Thionville, while the coal and iron reserves in theSaar region only accounted for ten percent of Germany s available resources.Yet theselection of Metz as the AEF s key target supported Pershing s emphasis on openwarfare.Breaking out of the trenches to resume a war of movement became a strategicnecessity because attacking Metz meant fighting in the open terrain on either side ofthe Moselle Valley.In this way, Pershing was consistent in the strategic vision that heestablished for his army and the specific targets he set.In June 1917, the first American troops landed in France.About two-thirds of theFirst Division consisted of raw recruits, and it would take months before the outfit wasready to enter the front lines.Both Wilson and Pershing appreciated, however, the sym-bolic importance of sending a contingent of American troops as quickly as possible toboost French morale.In an emotional July 4 ceremony before the Marquis de Lafayette s 16 WORLD WAR Itomb in Picpus Cemetery, Colonel Charles E.Stanton declared, Lafayette, nous voici! (Lafayette, we are here!), a statement that suggested the Americans had come to repaytheir debt to the French for aid rendered during the American Revolution.A battalion ofthe 16th Infantry from the First Division traveled from Saint Nazaire to Paris for the cer-emony, and joyful crowds cheered the troops, lavishing them with wreaths and bouquets. Many people, Pershing recalled, dropped on their knees in reverence as the columnwent by.These stirring scenes conveyed vividly the emotions of a people to whom theoutcome of the war had seemed all but hopeless. 18After much feting and celebrating, the Americans settled down to train, not bythemselves, but with the French 47th Division.The training regime of the First Divisionwould seem downright leisurely compared to the often-rushed programs followed bydivisions that arrived overseas in 1918, but ensconcing these troops with the French setan important precedent.Despite Pershing s insistence on developing an independenttraining regime, over the course of the war twenty-five American Divisions spent timetraining or fighting with the French while nine Divisions encamped with the British
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