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.'The latter hypothesis has no primaryrecommendation either to reason or the imagination, but acquires all itsinfluence on the imagination from the former.' This proposition contains two parts, which we shall endeavour to prove as distinctly and clearly, assuch abstruse subjects will permit.As to the first part of the proposition, that this philosophical hypothesishas no primary recommendation,, either to reason, or the imagination,we may soon satisfy ourselves with regard to reason by the followingreflections.The only existences, of which we are certain, are perceptions,which being immediately present to us by consciousness, command ourstrongest assent, and are the first foundation of all our conclusions.Theonly conclusion we can draw from the existence of one thing to that ofanother, is by means of the relation of cause and effect, which shews,that there is a connexion betwixt them, and that the existence of one isdependent on that of the other.The idea of this relation is deriv'd frompast experience, by which we find, that two beings are constantlyconjoin'd together, and are always present at once to the mind.But as nobeings are ever present to the mind but perceptions; it follows that wemay observe a con.unction or a relation of cause and effect betweendifferent perceptions, but can never observe it between perceptions andobjects.'Tis impossible, therefore, that from the existence or any of thequalities of the former, we can ever form any conclusion concerning theexistence of the latter, or ever satisfy our reason in this particular.'Tis no less certain, that this philosophical system has no primaryrecommendation to the imagination, and that that faculty wou'd never, ofitself, and by its original tendency, have fallen upon such a principle.Iconfess it will be somewhat difficult to prove this to the fall satisfaction ofthe reader; because it implies a negative, which in many cases will notadmit of any positive proof.If any one wou'd take the pains to examinethis question, and wou'd invent a system, to account for the direct originof this opinion from the imagination, we shou'd be able, by theexamination of that system, to pronounce a certain judgment in thepresent subject.Let it be taken for granted, that our perceptions arebroken, and interrupted, and however like, are still different from eachother; and let any one upon this supposition shew why the fancy, directlyand immediately, proceeds to the belief of another existence, resemblingthese perceptions in their nature, but yet continu'd, and uninterrupted,and identical; and after he has done this to my satisfaction, I promise torenounce my present opinion.Mean while I cannot forbear concluding,from the very abstractedness and difficulty of the first supposition, that'tis an improper subject for the fancy to work upon.Whoever wou'dexplain the origin of the common opinion concerning the continu'd and distinct existence of body, must take the mind in its common situation,and must proceed upon the supposition, that our perceptions are ouronly objects, and continue to exist even when they are not perceiv'd.Tho'this opinion be false, 'tis the most natural of any, and has alone anyprimary recommendation to the fancy.As to the second part of the proposition, that the philosophical systemacquires all its influence on the imagination from the vulgar one; we mayobserve, that this is a natural and unavoidable consequence of theforegoing conclusion, that it has no primary recommendation to reasonor the imagination.For as the philosophical system is found byexperience to take hold of many minds, and in particular of all those,who reflect ever so little on this subject, it must derive all its authorityfrom the vulgar system; since it has no original authority of its own.Themanner, in which these two systems, tho' directly contrary, are connectedtogether, may be explains, as follows.The imagination naturally runs on in this train of thinking.Ourperceptions are our only objects: Resembling perceptions are the same,however broken or uninterrupted in their appearance: This appealinginterruption is contrary to the identity: The interruption consequentlyextends not beyond the appearance, and the perception or object reallycontinues to exist, even when absent from us: Our sensible perception shave, therefore, a continu'd and uninterrupted existence.But as a littlereflection destroys this conclusion, that our perceptions have a continu'dexistence, by shewing that they have a dependent one, 'twou'd naturallybe expected, that we must altogether reject the opinion, that there is sucha thing in nature as a continu'd existence, which is preserv'd even whenit no longer appears to the senses.The case, however, is otherwise.Philosophers are so far from rejecting the opinion of a continu'dexistence upon rejecting that of the independence and continuance ofour sensible perceptions, that tho' all sects agree in the latter sentiment,the former, which is, in a manner, its necessary consequence, has beenpeculiar to a few extravagant sceptics; who after all maintained thatopinion in words only, and were never able to bring themselves sincerelyto believe it.There is a great difference betwixt such opinions as we form after a calmand profound reflection, and such as we embrace by a kind of instinct ornatural impulse, on account of their suitableness and conformity to themind
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