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.The plan to engage V-2s in the air, though never tried, was a bold one to attempt tomeet, in effect, tomorrow s weapons with to-day s defences.212 Collier believed& the Chiefs of Staff forfeited a unique chance of gaining valuableexperience of a new technique at trifling cost.Even if no hits were scored,Britain would have won the moral advantage of being the first nation toexperiment with anti-missile missiles in realistic conditions.213The V-2 attacks on London, and Britain s efforts to counter them, marked the beginning,not just of the ballistic missile era itself, but of a long and varied history of Britishinvolvement in the technically demanding and politically controversial field of ballisticmissile defence.NOTES1.Collier, Battle of the V-Weapons, p.113.2.King and Kutta, Impact, p.243.3.Aaron Karp, Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The Politics and Technics (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press for Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1996), p.37.4.Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (London: Pimlico, 1995), p.238.5.David Johnson, V-1 V-2: Hitler s Vengeance on London (Chelsea, MI: Scarborough House,1981), p.21.6.For a fuller history of early German rocket developments, see Johnson, V-1 V-2, pp.21 5.Collier, Battle of the V-Weapons, contains a useful and detailed chronology of the fullhistory of the V-1 and V-2 weapons.7.Irving, The Mare s Nest, p.18.8.Ibid.9.Ibid., p.21.10.Overy, Why the Allies Won, p.239.11.Irving, The Mare s Nest, p.137.12.Johnson, V-1 V-2, p.113.13.JSWS, p.541.14.Overy, Why the Allies Won, pp.240 1.15.Collier, Battle of the V-Weapons, pp.180 1.For a detailed description of the V-2, see JSWS,pp.541 2, Collier, Battle of the V-Weapons, pp.180 3, and King and Kutta, Impact, pp.239 42.One of the best collections of illustrations of the V-2 is Joachim Engelmann s V-2:Dawn of the Rocket Age (West Chester, PA: Schiffer Publishing, 1990).Britain and ballistic missile defence 1942 2002 2816.Circular Error Probable (CEP) is the radius within which 50 per cent of missiles areexpected to hit.The V-2 was a very inaccurate weapon.17.Collier, Battle of the V-Weapons, p.182.18.See King and Kutta, Impact, pp.239 42, for a full description of the firing process.19.This analysis of V-2 production costs is based on Karp, Ballistic Missile Proliferation, pp.39 41.20.Michael Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemunde and the Coming of the BallisticMissile Era (New York: Free Press, 1995), cited in Karp, Ballistic Missile Proliferation, p.40.21.A.S.Milward, The German Economy at War (London: Athlone Press, 1965), cited in Karp,Ballistic Missile Proliferation, p.39.22.Irving, The Mare s Nest, p.305.23.Ibid., p.13.24.King and Kutta, Impact, p.104.25.Collier, Defence of the UK, p.331.26.Collier, Battle of the V-Weapons, pp.26 7.27.Collier, Defence of the UK, p.340.28.Air Chief Marshal Sir Roderic Hill, Air Operations by Air Defence of Great Britain andFighter Command in Connection with the German Flying Bomb and Rocket Offensives,1944 1945.Official report by the Air Marshal Commanding Air Defence of Great Britainand subsequently Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief Fighter Command, submitted to theSecretary of State for Air on 17 April 1948.Published in Supplement to The London Gazette,19 October 1948.29.Irving, The Mare s Nest, pp.34 5.30.Collier, Defence of the UK, p.341.31.Public Record Office (PRO) CAB 80/68 COS(43)184(O) 11 April 1943 German LongRange Rocket Development.32.Irving, The Mare s Nest, p.45.33.Air Chief Marshal Sir Philip Joubert de la Ferte, Rocket (London: Hutchinson, 1957), p.58.34.COS(43)184(O), p.5.35.CAB 80/68 COS(43)189(O), 15 April 1943.36.Collier, Defence of the UK, p.342.37.Irving, The Mare s Nest, p.39.38.R.V.Jones, Most Secret War: British Scientific Intelligence 1939 1945 (London: HamishHamilton, 1978), p.428.39.Irving, The Mare s Nest, p.45.40.Collier, Battle of the V-Weapons, p.30.41.COS(43) 469, cited in Collier, Defence of the UK, p.343.42.King and Kutta, Impact, p.109.43.Jones, Most Secret War, pp.437 40.44.Irving, The Mare s Nest, pp.124 5.45.Ibid., p.125.46.Collier, Defence of the UK, p.349.47.CAB 80/75 COS(43)592(O), 29 September 1943 German Long Range Rockets: Report onReliability of Evidence Collected.48.Ibid., p.7.49.Ibid., p.9.50.Collier, Defence of the UK, p.350
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