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.On the 24th, Eisenhowerfederalized the Arkansas Guard and sent additional Federal troops toenforce the law.Southern political leaders were outraged.Senator Eastland called it anattempt to destroy the social order of the South ; Richard Russell complained of highhanded and illegal methods, Hitler-like storm-troopertactics, and bayonet-point rule. Although the black students were ableto attend the school and the crisis slowly faded during the next month, itshowed that the 1957 Civil Rights Act had done little to advance the causeof reasonable race relations in the South. I only hope that the magnificentwork that you accomplished last summer has not been destroyed by theevents in Arkansas, the historian C.Vann Woodward wrote Lyndon. Iconfess that those events make me less hopeful for the future of the Democratic party as well as for a solution to the integration problem. During the conflict, Lyndon tried to keep a low profile.Gerry Siegel,George Reedy, and Jim Rowe all advised Johnson not to be involved eitherdirectly or indirectly. Lyndon saw the political wisdom in their advice, buthe worried that the lack of constructive leadership or solutions wouldinjure the entire nation. The Arkansas situation is deeply disturbing, he 108 :: lyndon b.johnsonwrote Dean Acheson. .It is difficult to see a terminal point to a situation which is basically intolerable, and I am afraid that this country isheaded for some real moments of trouble. The task of responsible leadership.is to avoid irreconcilable positions, he wrote Chester Bowles. The emotional tensions that have been created cannot be confined to onepart of the country. Publicly, Johnson deplored the use of troops to maintain law and order and counseled self-restraint and prudence.When matters had calmed down in October, Jim Rowe urged him to become anintermediary between Faubus and Eisenhower.But the White House,which also considered discussing the situation with Johnson, sent him wordthat any conversation would bring a bombardment for a statement.andthis naturally had some of the potentialities of a trap. Convinced they wereright, and seeing no political gain for either the nation or himself, Lyndonallowed the crisis to run its course without intervention on his part.:: nasaA crisis over a Soviet-launched man-made earth satellite, Sputnik I, becameJohnson s principal public concern during the last months of 1957.Thesuccessful Soviet space launch sent a tremor of fear through the AmericanCongress, press, and public.Although the device weighed less than 200pounds and carried no military or scientific equipment, the country saw itas a demonstration of Soviet superiority in missiles and scientific education.Eisenhower assured the country that the satellite did not raise anyapprehensions in him and that he saw nothing significant in that development as far as security is concerned. But the country was unconvinced.Despite the President s assertion that the United States held the lead in arace for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), Americans, spurred bySoviet boasting, now feared that Moscow had the capacity to send nuclearwarheads across the ocean to strike their homeland.The Soviet accomplishment initiated a sharp debate in the United States, where interservicerivalry, underfunding, complacency, disparagement of egghead scientists,inferior education, [and] lack of imagination in a White House presidedover by a semiretired golfer received blame for America s second-class status in space.Democrats attacked the Eisenhower administration for allowing theUnited States to fall behind the Soviets.Lyndon also saw the potential forenhancing his candidacy. The issue [Sputnik] is one which, if properlyhandled, would blast the Republicans out of the water, unify the Democratic party, and elect you President, George Reedy wrote him.Johnson The Senator :: 109saw the political advantage to himself and the Democrats in seizing thespace issue.But he feared a witch hunt that might further undermine confidence in the country s military strength and reveal the administration asunable to meet the Soviet challenge.He believed that a restrained, nonpartisan investigation would best serve the country and himself.Richard Russell agreed.He asked Johnson to gather information fromthe Defense Department on the state of America s missile program beforedeciding on an appropriate course of action.The Pentagon was eager tocooperate. We very much appreciate the way you are approaching this, Ike s Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy told Johnson on October 21. .If through your efforts it is kept out of partisan politics, it will be for thegood of the public and we want to work with you. Yet McElroy had no illusions about the politics involved.As one assistant told him, No sooner hadSputnik s first beep-beep been heard via the press than the nation s legislators leaped forward like heavy drinkers hearing a cork pop. On November 3, the Soviets launched a second, much heavier satellitecarrying a dog.Two days later, Lyndon told Dulles that the country wasscared.Something had to be done
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